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Since the emergence of forensic DNA proﬁling and the corollary creation of DNA databases, efforts to
maximise the efﬁciency and utility of DNA technology have intensiﬁed. Such efforts are expedient given
the imperative that expenditure on DNA should be cost-effective and the beneﬁts demonstrable. The
practice of retaining DNA proﬁles in databases, either obtained from individuals involved in criminal
investigations, or retrieved from suspected crime scenes, has spread globally. The UK's National DNA
Database (NDNAD), created in 1995, is both one of the longest established, and biggest of such forensic
DNA databases internationally. As such, it is instructive to look at whether there is evidence to
demonstrate the effectiveness of this DNA database. This paper thus examines efforts to gauge the
effectiveness of forensic DNA databases, concluding that while the UK NDNAD may have led directly to
convictions in high proﬁle crimes, its broader impact upon public security goals remains elusive.
© 2019 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Thanks to television detectives and their ilk, the public are by
now familiar with criminals leaving their DNA at the scene of a
crime e allowing the police to quickly identify perpetrators, as well
as linking them to any other crimes theymay have committed. Even
if there is no arrest before the end credits, DNA proﬁles derived
from samples retrieved from crime scenes can be stored in a
database, and later used to ﬁnd a ‘matching’ suspect. In real life, this
practice of storing DNA retrieved from crime scenes in a database
has led directly to convictions in high proﬁle crimes, such as that of
the 1984 rape and murder of Melanie Road [1,2].1 The utility of DNA
in such serious crimes has helped secure signiﬁcant ﬁnancial in-
vestment and political commitment to expand forensic DNA data-
bases. Yet, while the value of a DNA database in individual
(particularly unsolved) cases is easy to ﬁnd, (most often in media
reports), the aggregate value of a DNA database remains
unascertained.ia.ac.uk (A.O. Amankwaa),
d in the generation of a DNA
ene, which was loaded on the
o matches until 2014, when
r DNA proﬁle loaded onto the
the 1984 murder. Police then
ﬁle matched the crime scene
an open access article under the CIn fact, it might be presumed from the prevalence of acclaim in
the media, and the signiﬁcance attached to a DNA ‘match’ by
criminal justice agents, that DNA databases make a vital contribu-
tion to criminal justice aims. In just one recent example from
Australia, the Police Minister stated that: ‘We know DNA is a more
effective way for police to prosecute and solve crime’, arguing that
expanding DNA databases will ‘help bring down high harm and
high volume crimes… - helping police solve thousands of unsolved
crimes and helping to catch serious offenders more easily’ [3]. Such
claims prompt the question of how it is known that DNA is ‘more
effective’, as the authority, reliability and relevance of claims made
for DNA databases as a policing tool are unclear, and ‘the signiﬁ-
cance of what can be gleaned from such data, particularly the
limitations, is not widely understood’ [4]. Indeed, in 2010, the US
Urban Institute undertook an examination of the beneﬁts of DNA
collection, as increasing numbers of States enacted laws to autho-
rise the collection of DNA upon arrest, and yet, ‘despite their
widespread adoption, little is known about the investigative utility
of collecting DNA from arrestees (…)’ [5].2
The primary purpose of a forensic DNA database is to provide
the police with intelligence on who may have been present at the
scene of a crime, particularly where the identity of the partici-
pant(s) is unknown [7]. A database of DNA proﬁles from crime
scenes may also provide intelligence on the existence of ‘links’2 Their research concluded that ‘arrestee DNA laws increased hits to forensic
proﬁles, but to an unknown degree [as] most states did not collect the data
necessary to calculate the discrete impact of arrestee proﬁles on public safety’ [6].
C BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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fenders and aiding in the analysis of crime patterns [8,9]. To
determine how well the UK DNA database assists in the perfor-
mance of these tasks, a measuremust bemade of the ‘effectiveness’
of the database; gauging the level at which the actual outcomes of
the system meet expectations [10]. Another closely related indi-
cator is efﬁciency, which is a measure of the value or worth of a
system by comparing its actual outcomes to that of alternative
systems or a cost/input-beneﬁt analysis of a system [11,12]. In the
context of forensic DNA databasing and criminal investigation, an
effective database should contain both subject reference proﬁles
and crime scene proﬁles and generate relevant matches that
contribute to the prevention, detection, and prosecution of crime e
i.e. make a net contribution to public security. An efﬁcient forensic
DNA database system should result in better public security out-
comes from use of the DNA database than alternative systems, or at
the very least, its public security outcomes should merit the input
required, (the ‘costs’) of the operation of the DNA database.
This paper aims then to assess the effectiveness of the UK Na-
tional DNA Database in assisting with the prevention and detection
of crime, and the prosecution and conviction of criminals. There are
of course additional considerations, which may require that con-
clusions are moderated, as any assessment necessarily takes place
against a backdrop of debate over the most appropriate legal
regime to govern the NDNAD, which will include the acceptability
and ethical operation of the database [13e15]. The ‘balancing’ of
private and public interests is necessary, with the inclusion of in-
dividuals (and the duration of their inclusion) on databases (and
therefore the diminishment of their right to privacy) needing to be
‘proportionate’ with the aims of law enforcement [16e18]. Thus,
the ‘cost’ to society and individuals when infringing their rights,
must be balanced with the beneﬁt to society of increased public
security. However, establishing this balance is difﬁcult with a lack
of adequate evidence to demonstrate how DNA databasing actually
contributes to public security.
After brieﬂy outlining the creation of the UK NDNAD and sub-
sequent debate over its form and function, we examine the criteria
by which to measure the effectiveness of DNA databases, what is
currentlymeasured, and the advantages and limitations of differing
models used for measuring effectiveness. The paper concludes by
questioning the efﬁciency of the UK NDNAD, given the lack of
meaningful evidence for its effectiveness.
2. The creation of the UK NDNAD
The UK was the ﬁrst country to embark upon the so-called
forensic DNA ‘revolution’ [19,20], with DNA proﬁling ﬁrst applied
to an immigration dispute in 1988 [21,22].3 It was soon realised that
this technique had potentially far wider application within the
criminal justice system. And so it proved, with the use of DNA in
policing expanding, assisted by rapid scientiﬁc and technological
developments accompanied by incremental legal reforms, enabling
the taking and use of DNA proﬁles to become integral to the
criminal process. The enthusiastic adoption of the new technique
was fuelled by both political and media hyperbole about the ben-
eﬁts of DNA proﬁling to crime detection and reduction. DNA
proﬁling was hailed as an uncomplicated success story, with the
NDNAD establishedwithout any dedicated legislation, thus evading
any focussed political or public debate [7]. The database was sup-
ported by a highly permissive legal regime, the result of continual
tinkering with the law between 1995 and 2003 governing: from3 The UK government required proof of familial relations to approve the asylum
status of a Ghanaian family [21,22].whom a sample could be taken and when in the criminal process;
the authority required to sanction and perform sampling; the
length of retention; and the uses of both DNA and the NDNAD. The
UK forensic DNA database thus quickly became the largest in the
world.
Prior to 2001, DNA databasing was restricted to convicted in-
dividuals, with the law requiring the destruction of records from
unconvicted individuals [23]. When two criminal prosecutions
based on unlawful database matches failed, an appeal to the House
of Lords shone a spotlight on the NDNAD [24,25]. The ‘compelling’
DNAmatch intelligence had been held inadmissible at trial because
the subject proﬁles were retained illegally on the database [24,25].
The Law Lords ruled however, that in such circumstances, a trial
judge should exercise their discretionwhen admitting the evidence
(so that it was not automatically inadmissible). These two cases
highlighted the potential public security ‘cost’ of restricting the
DNA database to only convicted people: the police could fail to
convict guilty offenders if their DNA has been retained unlawfully.
The potential for further legal challenges were also deemed likely
when in 2000, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary ‘guess-
timated’ that at least 50,000 ‘unlawfully retained’ samples (of non-
convicted individuals) were probably on the NDNAD [26]. In
response, the government quickly amended the law (again) to
ensure that these proﬁles e belonging to individuals who had not
been convicted of any crime ewere now ‘lawful’. With this further
incremental legal reform, England, Wales and Northern Ireland
now had the most inclusive DNA database in the world. DNA pro-
ﬁles could be taken without consent and permanently retained,
from all individuals arrested for ‘recordable’ offences [27,28]. These
proﬁles were to be used ‘for purposes related to the prevention or
detection of crime, the investigation of an offence or the conduct of
a prosecution’ [27].4 Volunteers, witnesses, and victims were also
included on the NDNAD if they consented, albeit this ‘consent’ was
controversial, with the NDNAD Ethics Group reporting that the
consent forms lacked adequate information [29].
The size of the database, which grew rapidly, and the inclusion
of ‘innocent’ (unconvicted) individuals began to attract critical
attention. Questions were posed about issues such as cost, effec-
tiveness, and ethics [8,26,30e35]. Such scrutiny did not always
result in the NDNAD looking like a good investment. Data wrestled
out of policing authorities showed that in fact the ‘success’ of DNA
proﬁling (beyond occasional high-proﬁle cases) really depended
upon the number and quality of DNA samples retrieved from crime
scenes, rather than the ~40,000 individuals a month being added to
the database [7]. During 2003/04, DNA was successfully recovered
and the proﬁle loaded on the database from just 5% of crime scenes
examined e and only ~17% of crimes received what could be
considered a scientiﬁc crime scene examination [36]. In 2007/08,
about 0.35% (17,614) of the ~5 million recorded crimes that year,
were detected using DNA, down from ~0.4% (19,949) in 2006/07
[37,38]. In fact, during the time of rapid expansion of the database,
the number of crimes detected using the NDNAD fell in 2004/05
and did not signiﬁcantly increase in the following 3 years [37,39].
Such outcomes, despite massive government investment during
the ‘DNA Expansion Programme’ (e intended to improve the
effectiveness of the NDNAD) led to the characterisation of DNA as ‘a
fresh ﬁlling between two slices of stale bread’ [40].
The expansion of the database to include all arrestees (regard-
less of conviction status) raised privacy concerns and was unsuc-
cessfully challenged through the UK courts, eventually reaching the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 2008, where it was4 This included minors, who if over 10 and under arrest, were treated the same as
adults, if, under 10, their parents could consent to sampling [27].
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[41].5 Domestically, the House of Lords had balanced the competing
interests of public security and individual privacy in favour of the
public [42], but the ‘Marper’ ruling in Europe demanded reforms to
the legislative regime governing the NDNAD [41], eventually
resulting in the enactment of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012
(PoFA) [43]. The NDNAD today remains governed by these rules
introduced by PoFA, with DNA samples from all individuals to be
destroyed following DNA proﬁling or within 6 months of collec-
tion.6 The DNA proﬁles of convicted adults and some juveniles are
indeﬁnitely retained while juveniles convicted of a ﬁrst minor
offence with a sentence of less than 5 years can be retained for 5
years plus the length of sentence. For unconvicted individuals, DNA
proﬁles of those charged for a serious offence are subject to an
automatic 3 years retention plus a 2 years renewal with consent of
the court. The same rule applies to those arrested for a serious
offence (but not charged) but the ﬁrst 3 years retention requires
consent of a Biometrics Commissioner established under PoFA.
Other temporal/short retention periods apply to those issuedwith a
penalty notice for disorder or where a ‘national security determi-
nation’ is made.7 All other arrestees and/or charged individuals are
subject to retention until the conclusion of the police investigation
or any proceedings.8
Underlying theMarper decisionwas a lack of empirical evidence
demonstrating the utility of retained DNA records from uncon-
victed individuals. Ten years on, this knowledge gap has not been
closed. Decisions on who should be included on the database and
how long to retain their data to maximise the effectiveness of the
database, are still not grounded in evidence. Whilst the match rate
of the NDNAD has increased following the introduction of PoFA,
this statistical data is limited in its ability to demonstrate public
security outcomes. Attempts to date to measure ‘effectiveness’,
with outcomes identiﬁed from the literature are discussed in the
next section.9 For example, a study comparing recidivism among repeat felons before and
after the introduction of the US CODIS Database in 1998 found similar results (51%
vs 49%). See Gabriel et al. [44].
10 The ‘crime solving’ capacity of any DNA database is limited to resolving those
crimes where DNA is present and detected (and leads to a ‘hit’ on a database). For3. Measuring ‘effectiveness’
3.1. a. Indicators for ‘effectiveness’
Analysis of the literature reveals seven ‘outcomes’ or ‘indicators’
by which the effectiveness of a forensic DNA database could be
assessed. Fig. 1 summarises these outcomes.
According to section 63T of the Police and Criminal Evidence
Act 1984, one of the primary aims of the UK NDNAD is to assist the
police to solve crime (‘crime solving capacity’). This should mean
an increase in case resolutions, normally considered as securing
convictions of offenders, indicates the crime solving capacity of
the NDNAD. However, Bieber [50] details four broad reasons why
convictions may not be an accurate measure: variation in the
treatment of DNA hits; problems associated with the trial or
evidentiary criteria; failure/inability of individuals to testify at
trial; and time constraints. Besides these challenges, it is very rare
that a DNA hit is the sole predictor of conviction since it is most5 The application to the ECtHR had been made by two unconvicted individuals, ‘S’
(a minor at the time of sampling) and Marper, both of whom had requested for the
destruction of their biometric records (DNA and ﬁngerprints) following their
acquittal and discontinuation of proceedings, respectively.
6 Samples e the human material from which the DNA proﬁle was derived, used
to be retained as well as the computer proﬁle.
7 A ‘National Security Determination’ is a writ by a Chief Constable to extend the
retention period of DNA records from an unconvicted individual on national se-
curity grounds.
8 For detailed discussion of the implementation of PoFA, see Amankwaa and
McCartney [15].often considered alongside other evidence. Furthermore, ‘case
resolution’ should be interpreted broadly and could encompass:
the contribution of DNA hits to the elimination of suspects; linking
of crimes; and saving time and resources by speeding up the
resolution of cases that may have been resolved eventually
without DNA [50]. Thus ‘convictions’ are a far too simplistic and
narrowly conceived measure of the ‘crime solving capacity’ of a
database.
The lengthy and/or frequent incapacitation of offenders through
imprisonment or other incapacitating disposals is assumed to
reduce crime rates [47,50,54e57]. The incapacitation effect of DNA
databases has thus been measured by some authors by assessing
crime rates [47,48,58]. However, it remains very unclear whether
the retention of DNA data and its downstream incapacitation ef-
fects can lead to a discernible reduction in crime, particularly when
most criminal justice disposals are very short or do not involve a
custodial sentence. Further, high rates of recidivism among con-
victed individuals, perhaps makes it more likely that crime rates
may increase subsequent to their conviction, or at least would not
decline measurably.9 It also needs bearing in mind that the pro-
portion of crimes that potentially could be, or are in fact ‘resolved’
utilising DNA database hits is very low,10 so any incapacitation ef-
fect directly attributable to a DNA database is going to barely reg-
ister statistically (particularly in low crime areas). Finally, not all
crimes are reported, much less detected.11 Further, crime rates are
impacted by numerous variables including socio-economic factors
and available statistics on crime rates are acknowledged to be crude
estimates. These reasons make it problematic in measuring the
overall independent role of DNA databases in crime reduction [50].
Incapacitation effects may thus be a weak outcome of the effec-
tiveness of DNA databases. It is undeniable however that many
serious criminal offenders will have been identiﬁed using a DNA
database and their subsequent incapacitation will have prevented
some crimes. Its appeal for advocates of DNA databasing, with the
allure and simplicity of the issue when garnering public support
thus remains despite serious limitations. Hence it cannot be
ignored as a potential outcome when considering the effectiveness
of DNA databasing.
Several reviews have highlighted the deterrent effect of DNA
databases as an indicator of effectiveness [30,50]. Whilst Doleac
[47,48] has attempted to measure deterrent effects of databases,
empirical evidence to adequately demonstrate this effect remains
scarce. Proposed research methods to estimate deterrence effects
include the measurement of perceived deterrence among ﬁrst-
time arrestees and convicted individuals, and assessment of
criminal records [61]. The comparison of the different groups may
help determine whether the retention of DNA data can modifyexample, this will exclude almost all so-called ‘white collar’ crime that will rarely
involve DNA, and ‘cybercrime’ will almost certainly not involve DNA. So a large
proportion of recorded crime will not have a ‘crime scene’, or will not have the
potential for DNA to play a role in the investigation [59]. See later the ‘link to
outcomes’ measures (section 3.2.2).
11 See Ofﬁce for National Statistics [60]: there is an acknowledged chasm between
the number of crimes recorded by the police, and the number of crimes that may
actually occur. For example, in 2017 according to the Crime Survey of England and
Wales estimate, there were 10.8 million crimes committed against adults aged over
16 (thus not including crime against businesses). However, in that year the police
recorded 5.2 million crimes. In year ending March 2017, the police closed almost
half (48%) of offences with no suspect identiﬁed. This proportion varies by crime
type with 68% of criminal damage and arson offences closed with no suspect
identiﬁed, compared with around 1 in 20 (6% or lower) rape or drug offences.
Fig. 1. Key ‘indicators’ of an effective national forensic DNA database based on assessment of existing literature [7,17,26,44e53].
12 The annual budget for the Ofﬁce of the Biometrics Commissioner is approxi-
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studies showing that offenders on the DNA database are likely to
demonstrate subsequent ‘good’ behaviour [58,62]. Critics of this
indicator argue that it may be impossible to prove this effect due
to several confounding variables. For example, recidivistic of-
fenders may change their modus operandi, offending behaviour,
or move location to prevent detection [34,50]. Like the incapaci-
tation effect, the deterrence effect of DNA databases may then be a
weak indicator of success. However, given the emphasis on this
hypothetical beneﬁt of databases [42], deterrence effects should
be examined more closely.
Privacy has been a central issue in discussions about the effec-
tiveness of DNA databases with the retention of data of innocent
individuals remaining contentious [34,63e69]. The literature
clearly shows that an effective DNA database should be lawful and
ethical. It's public protection goals in resolving, reducing or pre-
venting crime must be balanced with the human rights of in-
dividuals including the right to privacy. Hence, a true measure of
the effectiveness of DNA databasing should include how well it
protects the genetic privacy of individuals (privacy protection) and
its proportionality to public security interests (legitimacy). These
indicators should, therefore, be considered in assessing the success
of databases.
Finally, the time, effort and cost of implementing the DNA
database system should be justiﬁed. In addition to direct and
indirect costs of running the NDNAD (including sampling and
processing of DNA), new ﬁnancial costs have been generated bythe PoFA regime. Prior to the implementation of PoFA, the Chair
of the NDNAD Strategy Board stated that PoFA may introduce ‘a
signiﬁcant administrative burden’ [70], and involved: the estab-
lishment of the Ofﬁce of the Commissioner for the Retention and
Use of Biometric Material12; the destruction of DNA records;
introduction of DNA retention assessment procedures; changes
in IT infrastructure; DNA retention compliance checks; changes
in DNA retention practices; establishment of Biometric Retention
Units; and education of relevant stakeholders [15,43]. Assess-
ment of implementation efﬁciency and implementation cost is
important because DNA databasing is only one aspect of crime
control. There are other equally, or more important aspects of
police work (and that of other agencies) which also require
resourcing.
In summary, the question about the effectiveness of the
NDNAD could be answered by testing the NDNAD against the
seven identiﬁed outcomes or indicators outlined above: crime-
solving capacity, incapacitation effect, deterrence effect, protec-
tion of privacy, legitimacy, implementation efﬁciency and imple-
mentation cost. Despite the apparent clarity of these indicators or
outcomes, there have been difﬁculties in identifying speciﬁc
‘measures’ or isolating metrics that could be used to measure
these seven outcomes.mately £300,000 [51].
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The case resolution effectiveness of forensic DNA databases can
be framed within two contexts (“effectiveness context”):
1) its contribution to the resolution of crimes where DNA from the
crime scene is loaded on the database (‘DNA-related crime’);
and
2) its impact on the resolution of all recorded crime.3.2.1. i. Effectiveness context one: DNA-related crimes
In the ﬁrst context, several approaches have been taken to
measure the ‘effectiveness’ (performance or success rate) of
forensic DNA databases, the majority focussing upon matches
generated (‘hits’) and investigations aided (‘link to outcome’), both
described as output metrics [50]. ‘Hits’ are matches obtained from
the database, either between known individuals and crime scene
samples or matches between different crime scene samples. These
can be further categorised by offence type or for different categories
of individuals. Where a DNA hit contributes to the investigation of
an offence, this is counted as an investigation aided; the United
States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) uses this metric.13 In the
UK, the rate at which DNA was ‘linked to outcome’ is reported, i.e.
associated with a suspect being charged or cautioned for an offence
for example.
3.2.1.1. Match rates. The NDNAD Strategy Board reports the ‘match
rate’, which measures the chance that a crime scene proﬁle loaded
on the database matches the DNA data of a known individual. This
shows the ‘potential’ crime solving capacity of the database. The
match rate can also be computed for crime scene proﬁles or the
chance of a loaded subject proﬁle matching a stored crime scene
proﬁle. The match rate is calculated by dividing the number of
matches between loaded crime scene proﬁles and retained subject
proﬁles by the total number of crime scene proﬁles loaded. As of
December 2018, the NDNAD holds >6 million subject proﬁles and
>600,000 crime scene proﬁles [72]. The “match rate” of the data-
base reached its highest level from 2013e14 to 2017e18 (62%e66%)
[73]. This has been interpreted as an indication of improving per-
formance although the number of loaded subject and crime scene
proﬁles have decreased [59]. Further, available records show that
the proportion of crimes examined for forensic evidence has fallen
from 12.8% in 2014/15 to 11% in 2015/16 [74,75]. This suggests that
whilst the match rate may be high, the overall contribution of the
database to the resolution of all crime remains low.
One of the limitations of match rates is that they do not show
how the hits contribute to the progress or outcome of criminal
investigations. A DNA hit does not show that the subject is the
offender and there are many reasons why the DNA of an individual
may be found at a crime scene. DNA can be transferred directly or
indirectly and issues of persistence of the deposited material may
complicate the interpretation of the evidence [76,77]. In all cases,
the hit needs evaluation in the context of the alleged crime and
other evidence, yet whether the hit was probative is not captured
by match rates. Secondly, a DNA hit may not be relevant since the
identiﬁcation of the offender may have been established by other
means, for example eyewitness account, CCTV or ﬁngerprinting,
assuming identity was ever in doubt (in that they were not caught13 The United States National DNA Index (NDIS) holds >13 million proﬁles from
offenders, >3 million from arrestees and >900,000 from crime scenes; the number
of hits generated from the NDIS was >451,000 as of January 2019. This has
contributed to >440,000 investigations [71].‘in ﬂagrante’). Thirdly, the database also includes duplicate proﬁles
(currently >13% for the NDNAD) [72]. The match report does not
differentiate between duplicate hits and genuine hits. These factors
diminish the value of the match rate metric in assessing the success
of the NDNAD in the ﬁrst effectiveness context. The shortcomings
of the match rate thus make it necessary to develop further output
and outcomemetrics, leading to attempts to collect data on the link
between hits and case outcomes.
3.2.1.2. ‘Link to outcome’. In April 2014, a new framework, the
Recorded Crimes Outcomes Framework (RCOF), was introduced to
facilitate the police recording of case outcomes [74]. Eight out-
comes are considered under RCOF: charged or summonsed, caution
e youths, caution e adults, deceased offender, penalty notices for
disorder (PND), cannabis warning and community resolution. The
RCOF rate is a percentage of loaded crime scene proﬁles linked to a
counted outcome following a match on the NDNAD. According to
the NDNAD Strategy Board, the RCOF rate for 2014/15 was 41.6%,
representing 13,375 of 32,168 crime scene proﬁles loaded in that
ﬁscal year [74]. The RCOF rate for 2015/16 was 50.4% (11,378 of
22,584 crime scene proﬁles) [75]. When stratiﬁed by crime type,
homicides (81.9%) had a higher RCOF rate than rapes (55.6%),
vehicular thefts (40.8%) and domestic burglaries (40.2%) in the
2015/16 period. Although no statistical tests were carried out, the
ﬁgures suggest that the database may be more useful in investi-
gating or resolving violent crime than property crime. The 2016/17
report of the Strategy Board does not provide data on the RCOF rate
for that period. There are presently no records on the number of
convictions aided by the NDNAD since DNA-only cases are rare [78].
Clearly, the RCOF rates show that not all DNA hits are linked to a
counted outcome, with a considerable difference between the
match rate and RCOF rate (for example, match rate of 63.3% vs.
RCOF rate of 50.4% in 2015/16) [75]. Although the RCOF rates pro-
vide further insight on the usefulness of DNA hits, it still lacks
clarity on how the matches contribute to crime resolution and the
outcome of cases. The available data, however, shows that, upon
further ﬁltering, the proportion of proﬁles loaded on the database
that lead to case resolution after a hit may be lower than the match
rate and RCOF rate.
3.2.2. ii. Effectiveness context two: all recorded crime
The second “effectiveness context” of the NDNAD is its impact
on the resolution of all recorded crime. According to the Biometrics
Commissioner [59], DNAwas “linked to outcome” in just 0.3% of all
recorded crimes in England and Wales in 2015e16. As noted pre-
viously, this low rate remains unchanged since the database was
created in 1995. Even in cases where DNA might be expected to be
important, DNA is still, for the most part, insigniﬁcant as a crime-
solving tool. For example, in all recorded rapes, just 0.6% have a
DNA hit linked to their outcome, and in all recorded domestic
burglaries, 1.4% [59]. It is most helpful in all recorded homicides,
where it is linked to outcomes in 8.4% of cases [59]. Yet even when
DNA is linked to outcome, the reality is that the police often already
had a prime suspect. DNA is simply used to conﬁrm their identity
(so-called ‘warm hits’14) and help construct a prosecution case (or
persuade the suspect to plead guilty and/or accept a caution).
The courts in England and Wales have now established that
“where DNA is directly deposited in the course of the commission
of a crime by the offender, a very high DNA match with the
defendant is sufﬁcient to raise a case for the defendant to answer”14 Awarm hit refers to a match between a crime scene proﬁle and the proﬁle of an
individual already identiﬁed by other means such as ﬁngerprinting [9]. The hit is
only used to conﬁrm identity in such cases.
15 This estimate is reported in an unpublished National Policing Improvement
Agency study [84].
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court with no other evidence, this still depends on the overall cir-
cumstances of the case [80]. Further, while a DNA match might
have featured during a trial, it remains unknown whether the jury
placed any weight on the DNA evidence, considering the context of
the case and issues of transfer and persistence [77]. It is difﬁcult
then, to exclusively link a conviction to DNA evidence. Match rates
and ‘link to outcome’ metrics then fail in providing clear answers to
questions concerning the overall value of DNAdatabasing to solving
DNA-related cases and its contribution to solving all recorded
crime.
3.3. c. Extant evidence for the effectiveness of DNA evidence and
DNA databases
Systematic evidence to demonstrate the aggregate value of DNA
databases is presently lacking. This vacuum is perhaps explained in
part by a lack of demand for an evaluation of DNA databases or
difﬁculties due to the unavailability and inconsistency of data [45].
This section draws on ﬁndings from the limited research under-
taken which relates to the effectiveness of DNA databases in
different jurisdictions. Three groups of studies focussed upon
database performance/effectiveness or efﬁciency have been pub-
lished. The ﬁrst group analyzes the overall contribution or value of
DNA evidence and/or DNA databases to the detection of all crime.
These studies point to the marginal signiﬁcance of DNA evidence
and/or databases in crime detection or clearance overall. The sec-
ond group of studies examine the impact of DNA evidence and/or
the DNA database on crime detection or prevention in crimes that
involve DNA versus those that do not involve DNA. This group of
studies show that crimes where DNA evidence is available are more
likely to result in a detection or case resolution. Finally, the third
group of studies consider creating statistical models to systemati-
cally evaluate the performance and efﬁciency of DNA databases.
Only crude estimates of performance or effectiveness can be
determined with the current models available.
3.3.1. i. Contribution of DNA evidence and DNA databases to case
resolution
In 1999, Tracy and Morgan [81] assessed the overall effective-
ness of DNA typing/databasing in the United States by analysing
crime statistics, clearance rates, prosecution efﬁciency and cost-
effectiveness. Overall, the authors concluded that the actual
impact of DNA typing/databases on crimemay be lower than public
expectations e which suggests strong support for DNA databases
[82]. Of all indexed serious crimes (17.8% of all crimes) reported in
the FBI Uniform Crime Report (1997), 87.6% were crimes against
property (CAP) whilst 12.4% were an offence against the person
(OAP). The clearance rate of OAP (48.3%) was higher than CAP
(17.5%). This observationwas attributed to the fact that OAP usually
involves victim-offender interaction and may readily yield DNA
evidence to improve detection rates. For less serious or non-
indexed crimes (which make up 82.2% of all crimes), only 10.2%
are OAP. Analysis of ‘DNA prosecutions’ showed that DNA use is
restricted to OAP such as violent and sexual crimes. This data
suggests that DNA evidence contributes little to the resolution of all
crime and may be more valuable in serious crime. It was also found
that DNA is used more often in populous areas though more crimes
(64%) are prosecuted in less populous areas. Emphasising the fact
that DNA database initiatives are labour or resource intensive, the
expansion of DNA databases to cover all arrestees and the entire
population was thought to be cost-ineffective as well as having
negative civil liberty and ethical implications.
In England andWales, Burrows and Tarling [32] investigated the
contribution of forensic evidence including DNA in the detection ofproperty crime (burglary and vehicle crime). The study used data
available from the Home Ofﬁce ‘Pathﬁnder Project’ (June
2000eMay 2001) that focussed on two police forces, Greater
Manchester Police and Lancashire Constabulary. Additional infor-
mation from Morgan Harris Burrows' evaluation of the DNA
Expansion Programme was also included in the analysis. Of
approximately 1.8 million property crimes committed every year, it
was estimated that 612,000 (34%) are visited by crime scene in-
vestigators. Approximately 18% (110,040) of visited scenes yield
DNA (either SGMþ (6%) or Low copy number (LCN) DNA (12%)). The
proﬁling success of the crime scene DNA was found to be 60% for
SGM þ DNA and 18% for LCN DNA. The match rate for SGM þ DNA
was 73.3% whilst LCN DNA was 66.7%. Overall, 4% of visited scenes
led to the detection of crime using DNA matches. It was estimated
that ~10% of property crimes are detected by the police and both
ﬁngerprints and DNA contribute to about 33.3% of these detections.
The sole contribution of DNA and/or the NDNAD to the clear-up
rates was not estimated. Nevertheless, the study showed that
though DNA evidence appears to play a crucial role in property
crime, its overall contribution to crime resolution remains very low.
Similar to the results of Burrows and Tarling [32], other reviews
focused on property and serious crimes have found a low contri-
bution of databases in resolving crime. In England and Wales, the
estimated contribution was found to be ~1% for property crimes as
of 2002/2003 [83] and 15.10% for all murders15 in 2009/10 [84]. The
property crime review relied on publicly available data on the po-
tential number of DNA-related convictions versus the number of
reported property crimes as of 2002/2003. The murder crime study
was based on the opinion of Senior Investigating Ofﬁcers [84]. In
the Kennemerland police region of the Netherlands, Mapes et al.
[85] found that the national DNA database contributed to 1% and 3%
of property crimes and serious crimes (such as murder and sexual
assaults), respectively. This study utilised data from forensic reports
in 2011. Briody and Prenzler [83] also examined the potential effect
of DNA databases on property crime levels in New South Wales,
Australia. The evaluation report of the Vendas Police operation in
2002/2003 was analysed. There was no signiﬁcant reduction in
property crime levels before and after the implementation of
improved forensic biometric capabilities (DNA and ﬁngerprints). In
the United States, Wells et al. [86] found that only 1 out of 104
CODIS hits proceeded to charge in untested sexual assault kits. The
study examined 491 kits from the Houston Police Department and
hit outcomeswere assessed via interviews rather than actual follow
up of cases. Whilst the ﬁndings from the above studies are crude
estimates and based on “old” DNA analysis methodologies, they are
generally consistent with previous reports and the current outlook
of the UK NDNAD as a ‘marginal’ contributor to the resolution of all
crime [59,87,88].
The ﬁndings generally suggest that DNA databases are more
useful in solving a speciﬁc type of cases and has a potential impact
on offenders of certain characteristics. It is imperative that evalu-
ative studies on the actual effectiveness of databases are carried out
to identify characteristic patterns in the small number of applicable
cases. This will ensure that databases are cost-effective and focused
to assist the Police.
3.3.2. ii. Comparison of cases involving DNA and cases without DNA
The ‘ultimate’ outcomes of DNA hits, in terms of demonstrating
how DNA contributed to a criminal case and how the case was
resolved, are preferable over proxy output metrics such as number
of matches, number of investigations aided and match rates [89].
17 A cold hit refers to a match between a stored subject proﬁle and a proﬁle from a
crime scene where the perpetrator or suspect is unknown [9].
18 I.e. average of four additional offences per individual multiplied by 12 felons.
19 The CODIS National DNA Index (NDIS) is the national DNA database of the
United States. The NDIS was established in 1998 under the custodianship of the FBI
(see FBI [101]).
20
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involving DNA evidence and cases without DNA to understand the
impact DNA hits have on cases.
In Australia, Briody [90e92] assessed the effects of DNA evi-
dence in selected sexual and property crime and homicide cases
between 1994 and 2001. The Australian National Criminal Investi-
gation DNA Database (NCIDD) was established in April 2001 [93].
Thus, the selected cases were those inwhich DNA testing conﬁrmed
(or not) the involvement/identity of already identiﬁed or charged
suspects. Data was analysed using a control-comparison approach
to compare: 201 sexual offences with DNA to 98 cases without DNA
[90]; 100 property crimes with DNA to 100 non-DNA cases [92];
and 75 homicide DNA cases versus 75 non-DNA cases [91]. In all
three types of cases, it was found that those involving DNA aremore
likely to reach court than non-DNA cases. DNA evidence was
associated with more guilty pleas in property offences but not
sexual crimes and homicides. Sexual offence cases with DNA evi-
dencewere associatedwithmore guilty verdicts by a jury, andmore
and longer custodial sentencing. The three studies suggest that
coupled with a well-targeted and effectively utilised national DNA
database, the judicial outcomes of sexual and property crimes and
homicides could be improved.
In a similar prospective randomized study in the US, property
crime cases involving DNA analysis/a CODIS hit was associated with
an increase in suspect identiﬁcation, arrest rate and prosecution
rate [49]. The study analysed a total of 2160 cases between 2005
and 2007 in ﬁve cities in the US. Biological evidence was recovered
from all the cases included in the study. The cases were randomly
assigned into two groups: treatment group (DNA analysis group:
n¼ 1079) and control group (traditional investigation group
(including ﬁngerprint analysis): n¼ 1081). Suspect identiﬁcation,
the arrest rate and prosecution rate were higher in the treatment
group (31%, 21.9% and 19.3% respectively) than the control group
(12.8%, 10.1% and 8.1% respectively) [49]. Analysis of the cost-
effectiveness of the ‘DNA-assisted arrests’ revealed an average
cost of approximately $14,000 across the different states.16 Ac-
cording to the authors, this cost was higher than traditional
investigation such as ﬁngerprint analysis. Hence, though DNA may
be effective in resolving crime, investment in DNA databases should
be limited to those crimes where DNA is useful. Further, there
should be consideration of the availability of resources for other
policing work.
Lastly, Cross et al. [94] researched the impact of DNA on arrest in
sexual offences. The study reviewed 528 cases from Massachusetts
between 2008 and 2010. It was found that DNA could have been
inﬂuential in only 8 cases where arrests occurred near to the time
or after laboratory results were provided. This shows that the value
of DNA proﬁling and databasing depends on when a proﬁle or
match is produced and what inﬂuence it can then have through the
justice process. If a proﬁle is generated more quickly and/or
immediately loaded on the database, suspects may be identiﬁed
and processed speedily using DNA evidence (i.e. in such DNA-
related cases where identity of the offender is unknown). In this
regard, the introduction of rapid DNA testing may be useful in
enhancing the potential of databases [73,95e97]. However, as
shown in this study, the police may use alternative means to
identify and subsequently arrest suspects. These alternative mea-
sures may be more effective than DNA proﬁling and databasing
combined. Hence, the output/outcome of DNA analysis and data-
bases may be low [98]. There is limited information on how DNA
databasing compares with DNA proﬁling alone (i.e. without the use
of the database) and other detective resources [98]. Such an16 The cost covers arrests that would not have occurred without DNA [49].analysis is relevant because it will inform policy decisions on the
investment and scope of DNA proﬁling and databasing.
Cross et al. [94] also compared the bulk of cases (91.5%) where
the arrest occurred before DNA results and the DNA-related arrests.
It was found that the DNA arrest cases were more likely to link to
other crimes on the CODIS database to identify serial offenders.
Though limited in the number of cases, this study seems to suggest
that retaining DNA data from sexual crimes may be relevant.3.3.3. iii. Models to evaluate the performance/effectiveness of DNA
databases
Gabriel et al. [44] developed three performance metrics to
evaluate the effectiveness of DNA databases: 1) Signiﬁcance of a
database hit; 2) case progression and judicial resolution; 3) po-
tential reduction of future criminal activity. These three metrics
were then tested using 198 DNA cold hits17 obtained by the San
Francisco Police Department, USA, from 2001 to 2006. For the ﬁrst
metric, the study found that 90% of DNA hits aided police in-
vestigations including the identiﬁcation of suspects. Approximately
40% of the cold hits reached judicial resolution including convic-
tion, guilty plea or parole revocation. About 28% of the cases were
still under investigation or yet to be tried in court. It was expected
that the progress of pending cases could lead to ~70% judicial res-
olution. When broken down by offence type, the potential case
progression/judicial resolution rate for sexual cases (n¼ 110) was
~50%, homicide (n¼ 24) was ~91%, burglary (n¼ 42) was 88% and
other crimes was 40%.
For the third performance metric, the criminal history of 12
recidivistic sex felons was analysed. On average, each felon
committed ~25 offences including serious and minor offences. The
average for sexual offences was ~4 per individual. Compared to
published data indicating an average of 8 throughout the criminal
career of serial sex offenders [44,99], the authors estimated that
more than 40 offences18 could be prevented by DNA databasing
through its incapacitation effect. However, it was found that the
proportion of offences committed by the 12 felons before (51%) and
after (49%) the introduction of the CODIS national DNA database in
1998 was roughly similar. This suggests that the recidivistic
behaviour of offenders may inhibit the crime reduction ability of
DNA databases. For example, 45% of sexual crimes were committed
during probationary periods of the felons.
Walsh et al. [100] also developed two DNA database perfor-
mance metrics: Match/hit rate (HR: crime-person matches per
crime scene proﬁles loaded) and ‘return index’ (RI: total number of
matches (NH) per total number of proﬁles (NS). The two metrics
were tested using publicly available data from the UK NDNAD,
CODIS NDIS (USA),19 California SDIS20 and the Canadian National
DNA Databank (NDD-Canada) prior to 2008. Initially, the growth in
the size of the databases was analysed. The UK NDNAD, CODIS NDIS
and SDIS were found to ﬁt a quadratic model with positive changes
in growth linked to government/state policy (the DNA Expansion
Programme (UK), Presidents Initiative on DNA (USA), and Propo-
sition 69 (California)). The growth of the Canadian NDD was found
to closely ﬁt a linear model, demonstrating consistency inDNA databasing in the United States is operated at three tiers: National, State
and Local DNA Index Systems. The California State DNA Index System (SDIS) is the
database for the state of California. It is the largest state database with more than
2.9 million proﬁles as of January 2019 (see FBI [71]).
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pendent of database size, with no correlations observed. Though
the study establishes a model to assess effectiveness, the implica-
tions of the study are limited by the source of data used, the dif-
ferences in what counts as a hit, and lack of detail about the
characteristics of the databases examined. For example, it is not
clear whether only ‘cold hits’ were assessed or all hits. If the main
purpose of a database is to solve cold crimes, assessing all hits (cold
and warm) may be inappropriate.
In 2010, Walsh et al. [45] published an inferential model for
determining the performance and ﬁnancial efﬁciency of forensic
DNA databases. The performance formula, referred to as the return
index (RI) is given by RI ¼ HNC ; where H is the number of matches/
hits, N is the number of reference proﬁles in the database and C is
the number of crime scene proﬁles on the database. The variable H
is given by the formula: H ¼ aN  uCM ; where a refers to the average
fraction of active offenders on the database, u refers to the average
fraction of actual offender crime samples, M is the proportion of
active offenders from the population. The RI model was tested
using publicly available data from the UK NDNAD, the USA CODIS
and the Canadian NDD. A plot of H versus NC found that the
number of matches initially increases with the product of the
number of reference and crime scene proﬁles, but plateaus over
time. The reasons attributed to this observation include the
retirement of active criminals and/or incapacitation of offenders
making them inactive.
The DNA Working Group (DWG) of ENFSI [102] criticised the
Walsh Return Index, noting that the model suggests smaller data-
bases are more effective than larger databases. This is because the
RI is inversely proportional to the size of the database (NC). The
ENFSI Working Group proposed two alternative performance
metrics. The ﬁrst metric is H/C e the number of matches per
number of crime proﬁles loaded on the database. This formula
demonstrates the ‘potential’ crime-solving capacity of the database
and indicates whether the sampling of crime scenes is efﬁcient. It is
hypothesised that as the size of the database increases, H/C will
increase. The second metric is H/N e the number of matches per
number of reference proﬁles in the database. This metric shows
whether the database is representative of the active criminal
population and/or irrelevant reference proﬁles are not on the
database. A test of the H/Nmetric on European databases show that
the England and Wales NDNAD has the highest value (0.44) as of
June 2016 [103].
In 2013, Santos et al. [104] classiﬁed the inclusion/retention
regime of 22 European Union member states including the UK and
assessed their database performances. The study used the H/N
metric to evaluate performance. Two types of regimes emerged
from the analysis: restrictive and expansive regimes. The ﬁrst was
generally characterised by limited temporal retention of DNA re-
cords of suspects and individuals convicted of a serious offence. The
expansive system generally allows longer periods of retention and/
or indeﬁnite retention for suspects and individuals convicted of any
crime. Respective match rate data was extracted from the 2011
report of the ENFSI DWG. The then retention regime of England and
Wales was expansive, allowing indeﬁnite retention of all arrestees
whether convicted or not. The study compared the smaller,
restrictive databases with the bigger, expansive databases. Using
the Mann-Whitney test, the study found no statistically signiﬁcant
difference in the median H/N between the restrictive (0.095) and
expansive (0.100) systems (p> 0.5). This suggests that the type of
inclusion/retention regime, (and ergo the size of the database), is
unrelated to the performance of the database.
Although Santos et al. [104] offer a basis for comparative anal-
ysis of national databases, many factors affect the performance
metric used including variations in the implementation of legalsystems, the age of the database, previous changes in law, and
differences in counting database hits. Moreover, the classiﬁcation of
the legal systems may be too broad both within and between the
two categories. A further useful analysis to determine the impact of
the law and the value of DNA databasing could be ﬁltering the
performance ratio by retention category, retention time, and crime
type in a single state [105,106]. Though there were genuine reasons
for using the H/Nmetric, analysis of the crime-solving match rate e
H/C could be useful in demonstrating the potential contribution of
the database to public security. A research programme using both
H/C and H/N for different retention regimes, inclusion criteria and
retention lengths in a single state could offer a new understanding
of the potential effectiveness of databases.
Finally, another model used to assess database effectiveness is
the instrument variable (IV) strategy developed by Doleac [107].
The model was used to test the effect of DNA databases on crime in
the United States [107]. Firstly, the study analysed the criminal
history of offenders before and after DNA expansion in 7 states. The
probability of re-convicting serious violent and property offenders
was reduced by 17% and 6%, respectively, within 5 years of
expansion. Secondly, the size of the DNA database was compared to
crime rates from 2000 to 2010. The growth of the database was
associated with 7e45% and 5e35% decrease in violent and property
crimes, respectively. Analysis of the cost-effectiveness of using DNA
databases to investigate serious offences showed lower marginal
cost than other alternative crime-ﬁghting measures (<$600 versus
$7600 (longer sentences) or $26,300e62,500 (police ofﬁcers)). The
results of this study were consistent with a similar study by Doleac
et al. [108] that assessed the effectiveness of the Denmark DNA
Database (DDD) using the IV strategy. An expansion of the DDD in
2005was associatedwith a subsequent reduction in recidivism rate
by 26% within 5 years and an increase in crime detection by 0.09
crimes.
The IV strategy was also used by Doleac [109] to test the cross-
state effect of DNA database policies in the USA. The study
compared DNA database size and crime rates among states. It was
found that an increase in the total size of databases in external
states increases violent (0.0001) and property (0.0003) crime rates
in the reference state (p< 0.05). Also, an increase in the size of a
nearby state's database (<500 miles) increases violent (0.0011) and
property (0.0063) crime rates (p< 0.01). A similar trend was
observed when the total proﬁles of external states were weighted
by distance. Expansion of a nearby state database (100 miles) re-
sults in higher violent (0.0012 versus 0.00004) and property
(0.0042 versus 0.00004) crime rates than far away states (3000
miles). It was hypothesised that expansive DNA database policies in
one state lead to migration of criminals whilst restrictive policies
draw in criminals. An alternative effect is that the former lead to
incapacitation or deterrence of crime thereby reducing crime
across states. The results of the study demonstrated a negative
cross-state effect. It was recommended that to limit migration of
criminals, states must ensure equivalency in their DNA database
policies.
In summary, the three IV strategy-based studies demonstrate
that expansive DNA databases could reduce crime rates and limit
criminal activity. However, the results should be interpreted
cautiously since the data relied upon were estimates e which may
not be representative of the actual effects of DNA databases. Sec-
ondly, there are many confounders associated with criminal ac-
tivity and crime rates in a speciﬁc state including age, gender,
family structure, cultural context, educational level of residents,
alternative law enforcement resources, employment and other
crime-reduction policies. These factors were not accounted for in
the studies. Moreover, the usefulness of the DNA and the database
applies to a small proportion of all crimes as noted in section 3.3.1.
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Operating the UK National DNA Database costs the government
~£2.5m a year, while individual police forces must meet the (not
insigniﬁcant) costs of crime scene investigations and DNA analysis.
Yet what evidence exists shows that while DNA databasesmay offer
slightly improved detection or conviction rates, the overall contri-
bution of DNA databases to public security may be negligible. The
(limited) data from the UK can certainly be summarised in this way.
Furthermore, models developed to assess the effectiveness of da-
tabases in the small proportion of crimeswhere they are useful only
provide estimates that may not reﬂect actual effectiveness. There-
fore, considering the cost of operating the NDNAD, the question
remains over whether the database is providing a good ‘return on
investment’. The ENFSI DNA working group suggest that the UK's
NDNAD is closest to achieving a databasewith the data of the active
criminal population and the current PoFA retention regime may be
more effective than other regimes across Europe [103]. But while an
expansive inclusion/retention regime may increase the periods of
incapacitation of serial offenders through frequent detection and
conviction, DNA databases may interrupt criminal activity for just a
short period, and intractable recidivism may limit its full public
security potential.
Expansive regimes also pose a threat to civil liberties and human
rights, which must be accounted for in the operation of databases.
Casting a database as ‘effective’ when it may lack public support, or
is contested on ethical grounds, is problematic. Maintaining na-
tional DNA databases requires vigilance over the adequacy of
safeguards in protecting rights to privacy and avoiding negative
social impacts, particularly in light of scientiﬁc, technical, and
operational developments [15], albeit these debates are not the
focus of most research on ‘effectiveness’ and have not been entered
into in depth here. Sufﬁce to say, that the ethical credentials, and
public conﬁdence in a DNA database and its operation, are vital
components of a comprehensive measure of a database. The utility
of forensic databases must only be maximised at the same time as
minimising risks of abuse or other potentially harmful effects.
Based on the ﬁndings from this review, it is recommended that
oversight bodies such as the Strategy Board develop ongoing pro-
grammes to assess the end-to-end probative value of NDNAD hits.
Assessment of actual effectiveness should be a statutory require-
ment as part of the annual reporting of oversight bodies. Key in-
dicators of the overall effectiveness of the NDNAD should include
administrative data that demonstrate the crime-solving capacity of
the NDNAD, deterrence and incapacitation effects, implementation
costs and efﬁciency. Additionally, a national DNA Database Percep-
tion Index (DDPI) should be established. The DDPI should be
designed to assess the perception of the public and stakeholders on
regular basis and should cover the beneﬁts of the NDNAD and as-
pects of the database that cannot be measured directly such as
proportionality and the protection of civil liberties.
Until such time as data along these lines are available, we
remain a long way from gathering the evidence that could establish
how effective the UK NDNAD is, and whether the taking of half a
million DNA proﬁles a year and the storing of over 6 million proﬁles
is worthwhile. What we do know is that the limited knowledge of
the effectiveness of DNA continues to be a prominent theme in the
annual reports of the UK's Biometrics Commissioner [51,59,110].
The public may be willing to sacriﬁce some of their privacy for
societal beneﬁts, but if the beneﬁts cannot be evidenced, or remain
elusive, then that sacriﬁce may be questioned [82]. This knowledge
gap then remains critical as understanding effectiveness enables
measures to be implemented tomaximise the utility of the NDNAD.
In the absence of meaningful statistics and case evaluation, it is
hard to deduce the optimal scale and arrangements for an effectiveDNA database that enhances public security while protecting in-
dividual rights. There therefore needs to be continuing public
debate over the police use and retention of DNA. Far from being a
catch-all solution to modern crime, a case still needs to be made for
DNA evidence e apart, of course, from on TV detective shows.
Conﬂicts of interest
None.
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